Indispensable feature of MANETs is security. MANET is a sort of wireless network communications that can construct itself on the run. One of the significant properties of MANET is dynamic organization. To lodge the varying topology and to provide security, well defined routing algorithms are needed. No protocols detain all the security attacks and provide strategies to prevent them. A network layer protocol is necessary to incorporate all security solution to protect both route and data forwarding operations. The aim of this paper is to analyze security issues and their countermeasures in the ad hoc network layer environment. We discuss the hazards on the network layer and various security protocols.
COMMON NETWORK SECURITY ATTACKS IN MANETS
Wireless networks are more vulnerable than a wired network. There is a range of attacks aim at the weakness of MANETs. All data packets should pass through many intermediate nodes before reaching destination. Each node maintains route entry to other nodes in two ways either node itself initiates the route discovery or other nodes push to discover routes. Hence it maintains proper routing table entry and it becomes an essential job of mobile network communications. Route discovery and maintenance phase are always monitored by malicious node, make other nodes to follow fake route entry and disrupt the directions of the routing protocols. Some widespread network layer exposures and some of their controls are listed in Table 1 . 
Active Attacks
Active attack attempts to modify or destroy the data packets being exchanged between source and destination. Hence normal functionality of the communication will be disrupted. Operation of the protocol will be collapsed in order to limit availability or gain authentication. The aim of this attack is to attract all packets to the malicious node as means to drop or change packets to bring down the network. These attacks can be easily sensed and malicious nodes can be easily recognized. The compromised nodes may from internal or external. If it is from internal part of the network, it may be very tedious job to detect the node than external. Active attacks may be dropping of packets, modification of packets, replaying of packets, impersonation as some other nodes, fabrication of messages, and rushing of packets over high-speed private network like wormhole attack [5] [6] and black hole attack [7] .
Attacks based on modification
Routing protocol packets bring control messages which rule data transmission among nodes. Malicious node announces fake routes to reach destination and cause redirection of network traffic. This is uncomplicated way for a malicious node to upset the operations of an ad-hoc network. This attack may consist of the adaptation of the metric value for a route or by modification of control message fields. This attack can be classified as redirection attacks and DOS attacks. i. Redirection by modified route sequence number: To choose a reliable path each node relies on the information like hop count, sequence number etc. The smaller in value shows the most favorable route. So easy way of attacking is to change the original values with the smaller values to attract nodes, whose packets to be intercepted. ii. Redirection by modified hop count: The protocol like AODV, the optimal path is selected based on the path length where as path length is denoted as hop count metric. A malicious node can advertise smallest hop count to a particular destination through itself to attract all data packet to that destination. iii. Denial of Service by modifying source route: A malicious node insert itself between communicating parties and dominates over data packets passing through them. This can modify the source route so that can create loops or drops packet to launch denial of service attack.
Impersonation Attacks
Attacker node pretends its identity by changing its" own IP or MAC address and adopt some other node identity. This is also called "spoofing". The attacker node masquerading as another node and can launch many attacks like route looping, isolating nodes etc. This type of an attack could easily be improved by the use of a well built authentication procedures.
Attacks by Fabrication of Information
Generation of fake route messages is said to be fabrication of information. In [8] , Fabrication attacks include "active forge" sends forged message without receiving any messages and "forge reply" sends forged reply to original route request. There are 3 sub categories for fabrication attacks.
Falsification of Route Error Messages
This is very common in AODV and DSR, because these two protocols use maintenance measures if the destination node or intermediate node in an optimal path moves or fails. The node which precedes the failed link sends a Route error message to all other neighboring nodes that it follows a broken link. Then all nodes invalidate that particular route as inaccessible path and removes routing table entry. A malicious node can spoof any node and send fake route error message to all other nodes. Thus a Denial of Service attack can quiet easily be launched. The node S has route to D passing through X, Y, and Z as in Figure1 malicious node M tries to insert itself in to the network, and launch a Denial of Service attack against the destination node D. It sends forged route error messages to other nodes that route between Z and D is no longer accessible. So that X and Y deletes its" routing table entry to the node D through Z. 
Route Cache Poisoning
This is very common attack in DSR protocol. A node overhears any packets which may pose routing information in their header will be updated in the routing cache of that node. This method of learning routes will be exploited by malicious nodes. They send spoofed packets to other nodes via themselves, such that other nodes may alter their routing cache and start communicating with attacker node. This result in congestion of network, network inaccessible or least advantageous path selection.
Routing table overflow attack
Proactive algorithms are more vulnerable to this attack. Proactive protocols try to find routes even before they need and a malicious node misleads the protocol to find routes to nonexistent nodes. Thus no more routes can be stored in the routing table because they already stuffed with fake routes. In any of the 3 cases, recognition of attack is very difficult.
Routing Attacks
A malicious node can absorb network traffic, add itself into the routing path between communicating parties and be in command of network traffic. As shown in the figure 1, a malicious node M can insert itself between sender S and receiver D [9] .
Packet Replication attack
An attacker replicates the stale packets. Thus network resources like bandwidth and battery power will be consumed.
Rushing attack
As shown in the Figure 2 , an attacker obtains the RouteRequest packet from source node floods that packet rapidly to all the other nodes in the network. Thus all nodes will receive forged route request before the original request reaches them. Later while reaching nodes, original RouteRequest packet will be treated as a duplicate one and rejected. Rushing attack is an effective denial-of-service attack against all on-demand network routing protocols [10] . 
Other Advanced Network Attacks
More sophisticated and subtle routing attacks have been identified in recent research papers. The black hole, Byzantine and wormhole attacks are the typical examples, which are described in detail below.
Wormhole attack
Wormhole attack connects one part of the network to another via exclusive path; packets are passed over this path in a rapid speed. An adversary tunnels packets from one point to another and control over the packets from that point [11] . This attack can be easily launched in reactive protocols like DSR and AODV. The RouteRequest from source will be directly tunneled from one compromised node to another, from that Route Requests are replayed to other nodes, and reaches destination. If the same requests travel through normal path will be discarded. Thus wormhole attack redirects all packets via compromised nodes. The attacker does not need to know about any cryptographic methods or keys, hence wormhole attack is launched against all exchange of information that offers authenticity and privacy. In figure 3 , source S sends RouteRequest to Destination D through all neighboring nodes. Node X and Y tunnels the request, reaches node D, makes it to accept the route, and makes node D to reject the requests from other nodes as duplicate requests. 
Black hole attack
A node in the selected path is an attacker can deny the communication to take place. As shown in the Figure 4 , if an adversary is selected as an intermediate node then it stops the packet forwarding to next node. This is a common attack in AODV protocol. Once a malicious node receives a RREQ, it sends RREP packet with higher sequence number without delay. Hence source node starts communicating with malicious node and discard RREP comes from other nodes. It consumes all data packets and not passing to anywhere.
Figure 4. Illustration of Black hole attack in a Network

Gray hole attack
A smaller variation of black hole attack is gray hole attack. This partially drops the data packets. This may happen selectively or statistically. In both the cases detection of attack is very complicated.
Byzantine attack
An adversary node or a group of malicious nodes working together to do attacks such as create routing loops, dropping of packets or stop forwarding packets, selective dropping of packets, forwarding packets through least favorable paths. This attack is simple to recognize, thus it gradually degrades the performance of the network [12] .
Resource consumption attack
In ad hoc environment power of nodes is very crucial factor to keep alive. An adversary node can try to consume battery power by forwarding unwanted data packets, creating loop routes, thus node will lose power without reaching destination, or demanding unnecessary route discovery to the target node. So that victim node slowly depreciate its" battery power.
Location disclosure attack
An attacker discloses information about the construction of nodes in a network. It smells the location of nodes, the way nodes are arranged. It figures out the important nodes and their communicating parties, analysis network traffic pattern. Based on that it draws the routing plan and generate attack scenarios. This attack overwhelms security at times.
DEFENSE METRICS AGAINST ROUTING ATTACKS IN MANET
Network layer faces a prominent range of security threats than other layers in MANET. Efficient routing protocols may protect the network in a fair way such that even in the presence of malicious node. Protocol detects any malicious node; rest of network should be altered about the existence of this poisoning node. Thus other nodes can change their route entry, which includes that adversary node as one of the intermediate nodes.
Well-organized protocol should preserve network topology to protect information like nodes play important roles, analysis of traffic flow etc. Some SRPs have been discussed about many solutions for attack imposed in MANETs such as IPsec, SAODV, SEAD, SRP, ARAN, SSL, and so on. But none of them gives total protection against all attacks. All preventive mechanisms rely on cryptography to ensure security to provide authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non repudiation of routing information. The goals and methods of some protection schemes have been discussed below.
Secure Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol (SAODV) [13]
SAODV is an effort to add security to SODV. The key attribute of SAODV is using digital signature to authenticate the fields of routing messages and using hash chains to authenticate hop count. It uses node-to-node verification so that establishes endto-end authentication. RREQs are digitally signed and propagated, in each node the signature is verified before updating the routing table. RREQs include single signature extension. This same process is followed for RREPs also. The intermediate nodes should sign the RREP as it comes from destination node, it uses double signature extension. All fields are immutable except hop count. The hop count is authenticated by hop count authenticator, is a hash chain element.
Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks (ARAN) [14]
ARAN is a security protocol based on public-key cryptography against all malicious nodes which may cause impersonation or repudiation attack. It introduces authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation concepts, hence it operates on cryptographic certificates. Each node holds a certificate signed by trusted authority which connects IP address and public key. The functionality of this on-demand routing protocol is divided as route discovery and route maintenance. RREQ packet of ARAN contains address of destination, certificate of source, nonce, and a timestamp. The first intermediate node checks the signature of source and appends its" own certificate with original. All later intermediate nodes removes the certificate of pervious node and appends its" certificate. Thus each node makes an entry in their routing table. The same process is again replicated for RREP packet also. If any path breaks, that particular node sends ROUTE ERROR message to previous node. Then ROUTE ERROR message will be passed to other nodes in that route and route entry in each node will be removed from route table. Though ARAN is pretty well against attacks, little vulnerable to DoS attack by flooding the network with fake data packets. Hence all packets need verification which slows the network, force the node to drop some packets. S. Yi et al., recommended a protocol based on on-demand protocols like AODV or DSR, uses symmetric key encryption. This can be easily deployed on the top of any existing protocols, without any major issues. This protocol makes use of word Trust Hierarchy, each node is assigned with different trust levels. And this trust levels are immutable. Source node defines the minimum trust level to nodes to participate in the route discovery; hence a node of particular trust level will possess a key for that level. This key value to set each security level among nodes, thus this process produces trouble that a fresh key has to be set for each node which is subject to come in or go out of the network. In route discovery stage, additional fields are given to RREQ and RREP packets. Source node indicates minimum trust level in RREQ packet; an intermediate node should possess this trust level to be a part of the network. When an intermediate node receives this RREQ packet, it checks for the security rating in RREQ packet and compares with the value it has. If it is greater than the request packet value, then it forwards it else it drops the packet. Another field gives maximum security level can be given by the discovered path. An optimal route is discovered by SAR need not to be a shortest path but it ensures the path found is the most protected in terms of trust level. There is a possibility that an attacker may give higher trust level key to a node though it owns lower trust level.
Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [16]
Secure Routing Protocol can be applied on any top of the existing protocols. This protocol guarantees that the source node which initiates route discovery will be able to differentiate genuine replies and fabricated replies to give fake topological information and discard it. This can be achieved through the basic idea Security Association (SA) between the source and the destination to authenticate Route Request and Route Response packets using Message Authentication Codes. SA can be attained by a shared key based on the other party"s public key, is used for both encryption and decryption. SRP is an extension header, attached to RREQ and RREP, when an intermediate node receives RREQ, it checks whether SRP header is present or not. If not present, packet will be rejected. Else the IP address of source and destination will be extracted and it creates an entry in its routing table. An intermediate node with cached route shares a group key with source node can use that group key to authenticate the RREPs. The destination node has to counter to source with different types of topology in order to reply to the one or more route request packets.
SEAD [17]
SEAD protocol is designed on the DSDV protocol. The goal of this protocol is defend modification attacks, routing attacks, and Dos attacks. It implements on-way hash function instead of asymmetric cryptographic operations to prevent adversary nodes from changing of sequence number and hop count. SEAD authenticates those values of each update routing information. This protocol needs broadcast authentication like TESLA [12] or a symmetric key cryptography. SEAD evades routing loops, but the downside is an adversary node uses the information of sequence number and hop count which were the recent updates of routing information and updates a new routing message.
ARIADNE [18]
Ariadne is a design and performance evaluation of reactive protocols. It uses symmetric cryptographic primitives. Ariadne authenticates its" routing messages through TESLA a authentication broadcast uses Message Authentication Code (MAC) and this needs low synchronization time than using pair-wise shared keys. Hence it establishes secure end-to-end communication. 
DISCUSSION ON OPEN CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS:
We have discussed various routing attacks in ad hoc environment and many defense metrics against those attacks in this survey. Defense will be achieved successfully if prevention metrics should work as a base line. Detection and reaction against attacks should be done as soon as possible if any malicious nodes have been sketched. Protocols plays key role in terms of security. They should offer error-free and wellorganized networks. If any path break or partition of network happens there in the position that they could reorganize the network. Presently working protocols are against one or more routing attacks not for all the attacks that a network layer may anticipate. Dynamic infrastructure of ad hoc environment forces it to be more vulnerable to attack and makes it hard to detect malicious node entrant. Cryptography is one of the key techniques to provide security and prevent attacks as well. There are many efficient key exchange or distribution protocols have been launched for security. But they are confined because of limited resources and dynamic topology. A lot of research efforts should be carried out to find an efficient and effective routing protocol that should bind the characteristics minimum complexity and less cost.
